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Abstract.  Although  recent  research  found  substantial  variation  in  the  strength  of  anti-
immigrant opinions across new and old countries of immigration, most studies determined 
that the public increasingly supports restrictive immigration policies. This paper explores 
several  sources  of  attitudes  toward  immigrants  in  United  Kingdom  and  attempts  to 
simultaneously test some of the most important theoretical explanations of public attitudes 
toward  immigration  issues  when  the  family  immigration  history  is  taken  into  account. 
Results are based on a quantitative analysis of data from the European Social Survey (Round 
4/2008). Even if when compared to persons from families with at least one foreign-born 
member  natives  express  the  strongest  opposition  to  flexible  migration  policies  and  are 
more likely to have negative views regarding the immigrants’ role in the British society, 
opinions  vary  significantly  among  groups  differentiated  by  political  preferences, 
socioeconomic  attributes,  and  demographic  characteristics.  While  for  native  Britons 
findings support the economic self-interest theory, education and social attachment (i.e., 
interpersonal  and  institutional  trust)  appear  to  be  the  strongest  predictors  of  positive 
attitudes toward immigrants and opposition to restrictive immigration policies. 
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Introduction 
 
As Mayda (2006, 528) noted, in many countries, immigration has recently 
become  a  central  theme  in  political  discussions  focusing  on  international 
integration.  In  order  to  better  understand  country-level  immigration-policy 
decisions and to anticipate future policy developments, public attitudes toward 
immigration-related issues should be known because they are a key input in policy 
outcomes and their viability.                        
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During  the  past  two  decades,  many  studies  on  public  attitudes  toward 
immigrants and immigration policies in Europe and the United States consistently 
showed that immigrant populations are frequently facing suspicion, prejudice, and 
xenophobia in their host countries. Research also documented an increased public 
support  for  restrictive  immigration  policies  (see  Brader,  Valentino,  and  Jardina 
2009, DiGiusto and Jolly 2008, Fetzer 2011, Quillian 1995, Schildkraut 2011). As 
Crawley (2005) observed, United Kingdom is one of the ‘receiving’ countries in 
Europe,  which  apparently  shares  this  general  uneasiness  of  being  a  country  of 
immigration.  
Based  on  recent  data,  in  June  2010,  the  foreign-born  population 
represented 11.4% of the UK total population and non-British nationals made up 
7.2% of the UK population (Mulley 2011, 2). The foreign-born population in United 
Kingdom increased significantly from 2,342,000 in 2000 to 3,824,000 in 2007. If in 
2000, foreign-born persons represented approximately 4% of total population, in 
2007, foreigners represented 6.5% of the total population and about 7.2% of the 
labor  force  in  the  country.  However,  the  1990-2007  average  net migration per 
1,000 people was only 0.7, a figure lower than that registered for the same time 
period  in  selected  thirteen  OECD  countries  (i.e.,  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium, 
Denmark,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Luxemburg,  Netherlands,  Spain,  Sweden, 
Switzerland, and United States). The Western European countries that averaged 
the highest 1990-2007 net migration rate are Luxembourg (9.8), Spain (7.0), and 
Switzerland (4.3) (U. S. Census Bureau 2011, 839).  
Although  the  foreign-born  population  is  not  particularly  large  in  United 
Kingdom, and even if, as Crawley (2005) noted, attitudes toward immigrants and 
immigration  policy  vary  by  region  and  groups  in  society,  ad  hoc  polls  and 
longitudinal surveys conducted in the last ten years have provided evidence of 
increasing public opposition to immigration. In fact, Lowles and Painter (2011), the 
authors of a recent research study focusing on issues of English identity, faith and 
race concluded that there is not a progressive majority in the British society and 
that there is a deep resentment to immigration, as well as skepticism towards 
multiculturalism. The research findings, based on a survey carried out on a large 
probability sample (N= 5,054), showed that approximately 63% of whites, 43% of 
Asians, and 17% of black Britons consider that immigration was a bad thing for the 
country. The study also found that 39% of Asians, 34% of whites and 21% of blacks 
believed immigration should be halted either permanently or at least until the UK's  
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economy was back on track. In addition, almost half (48%) of the respondents were 
open to supporting a new far-right party as long as it avoided fascist tendencies 
and  did  not  condone  violence.  Furthermore,  even  if  52%  of  study  participants 
agreed that "Muslims create problems in the UK,” over two-thirds of people believe 
that ‘English nationalist extremists’ and ‘Muslim extremists’ are equally appalling. 
Approximately  60%  of  respondents  considered  that  positive  approaches  (e.g., 
community organizing, education, and using community leaders) were the best way 
to defeat local extremist tendencies. In sum, although anti-immigration feelings are 
pervasive in the contemporary British society, political violence is opposed by the 
large majority of the residents (Lowles and Painter 2011).  
The  present  secondary  analysis  intends  to  identify  the  individual-level 
indicators most likely to predict support for restrictive immigration policies and also 
tries to determine which factors significantly influence the public perception of the 
immigrants’ role in the British society. The majority of studies that examined the 
effect of individual predictors on attitudes toward immigrants/immigration focused 
exclusively on the natives’ perceptions or did not take into account the immigration 
history of the respondent’s family.  
This  analysis  contributes  to  the  literature  by  examining  predictors  of 
attitudes  toward  immigrants  and  immigration  policies  expressed  not  only  by 
natives but also by foreign-born individuals and persons who grew up in immigrant 
families. Alternative theoretical explanations of the public reactions to immigrant 
issues  (e.g.,  economic  theory,  cultural  marginality  theory,  contact  theory,  and 
human capital theory) as well as the effects on attitudes of political preferences, 
societal attachment (i.e., interpersonal and institutional trust), and religiosity are 
also explored in multivariate analyses conducted on a representative sample of UK 
residents. 
 
Brief review of theoretical explanations of public attitudes toward immigration 
 
Fetzer  (2000)  contended  that  there  are  three  major  theoretical 
explanations  (i.e.,  cultural  marginality,  economic  self-interest,  and  contact  with 
immigrants) of public attitudes toward immigrants. In general, marginality theory 
states that marginalized groups tend to empathize with other oppressed people, 
persons  who  perceive  themselves  as  being  outside  the  ‘mainstream’,  or  other 
victims of prejudice (Fetzer 2000). In a version of the cultural marginality theory,                       
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(see Espenshade and Calhoun 1993), “cultural affinity” is considered one of the 
most  important  determinants  of  immigration-related  public  attitudes.  In  this 
respect, “cultural and ethnic ties to immigrants promote pro-immigrant attitudes 
and support for a more open immigration policy (Fetzer 2000, 3).” In addition, 
Haubert and Fussell (2006) found that one’s exposure to other cultures (i.e., living 
abroad) was positively associated with favorable views of immigrants. The authors 
argued  that  living  abroad  contributes  to  a  more  cosmopolitan  worldview, 
diminishing the importance of negative stereotypes about foreigners. In addition, 
(see Alvarado 2009), persons who lived in foreign countries tend to observe more 
often  commonalities  among  individuals  from  diverse  ethnic  and  cultural 
backgrounds than people familiar only with their native land. In a recent analysis of 
factors influencing pro-immigrant feelings in United States, Alvarado (2009) found 
that Americans who speak relatively well one foreign language are more likely to 
have positive perceptions of immigrants. It is possible that persons who learn a 
foreign language do that because they are interested to learn more about other 
cultures  and  do  not  share  ethnocentric  views,  as those  generally  expressed  by 
persons who take a ‘parochial’ stance on public issue (see Bean 1995), immigration 
policy included.  
Empirical studies  showed that  when  perceived  as  a  cultural  threat  (see 
Espenshade and Hempste 1996) or as a potential threat to the natives’ language 
(see Chandler and Tsai 2001), immigrants are more likely to attract negative public 
sentiments. Using 2008 pre-election data, Brader, Valentino, and Jardina (2009) 
contended  that,  at  least  in  the  United  States,  ethnocentrism  and  not  material 
interests  continue  to  dominate  explanations  of  public  attitudes  regarding 
immigration policies. In a study that explored the causes of public opposition to 
immigration  and  support  for  anti-immigrant  political  movements  in  three 
industrialized  Western  countries  (United  States,  France  and  Germany)  and 
evaluated the effects of cultural marginality, economic self-interest, and contact 
with immigrants, Fetzer (2000) contended that although the data analysis partly 
confirmed each of these three theoretical explanations, being a cultural outsider 
influenced immigration-related attitudes more than economics or contact did. The 
present  analysis  will  explore  the  validity  of  the  cultural  marginality  thesis 
comparing groups differentiated by the place of birth (i.e., UK or abroad) of the 
respondent and respondent’s parents. In addition, ethnic minority status will be 
used to test this theory.   
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Some proponents of an alternative theoretical perspective – economic self-
interest  -  doubted  cultural  explanations  of  attitudes  toward  immigrants  (see 
Harwood 1983, 1986) and argued that economic concerns appear to be the main 
reason  for  an  increased  opposition  to  both  legal  and  illegal  immigrants.  Simon 
(1987) and Simon and Alexander (1993) noted that immigrants are perceived as a 
greater threat by lower-class people, who fear that immigrants, especially illegal 
ones, would lower the rates of pay, would negatively influence one’s opportunities 
for mobility, and would create more competition for housing, schools, and social 
services. According to this view, opposition to immigration is mainly caused by 
economic deprivation and fear of further economic decline.  
Economic interpretations of public attitudes toward immigrants are found 
in many scholarly works and several of these studies provide empirical support for 
the  economic  self-interest  theoretical  perspective.  In  a  recent  examination  of 
structural correlates of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies in the 
United  States,  Sobczak  (2010)  asserted  that  economic  disadvantage  at  the 
community  level  indirectly  influences  unfavorable  views  of  immigrants  because 
precarious economic conditions generate high levels of intergroup occupational 
competition, leading to negative reactions toward foreigners. In addition, Haubert 
and Fussell (2006) have noticed that the perceived threat from immigrants in the 
labor market is context specific, being more pronounced in areas where there are 
large immigrant communities.  
Based on their analysis of 1983-1990 data from the British Social Attitudes 
Survey,  Dustmann  and  Preston  (2007)  pointed  out  that  even  if  economic 
determinants did matter when attitudes toward immigrants have been examined 
racial prejudice appeared to be an important factor in preference formation in 
Great Britain. Overall, findings showed that welfare concerns had a stronger impact 
on attitudes to further immigration than labor market concerns did. In addition, the 
authors found strong evidence that racial or cultural prejudice was associated with 
support for restrictive immigration policies regarding potential immigration from 
countries  with  ethnically  different  (non-Caucasian)  populations.  Using  recent 
survey data from United Kingdom, Lowles and Painter (2011) identified a clear 
correlation  between  economic  pessimism  and  negative  attitudes  towards 
immigration. The authors noted that the more skeptical people were about their 
own economic situation and their prospects for the future, the more hostile their 
attitudes were to new and old immigrants.                       
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In a study of public attitudes toward immigrants in United States, France, 
and Germany, Joel Fetzer also acknowledged that beliefs that immigrants threaten 
natives’ or one’s own job strongly increase opposition to immigration. However, 
the author noted that this sense of economic threat appears to be much reduced 
among  persons  who  have  at  least  secondary  school  education  (Fetzer  2000). 
O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006), the authors of a cross-country study that investigated 
the determinants of individual attitudes toward immigration concluded that anti-
immigration opinions are not a function of economic interests alone; rather, they 
also reflect nationalist sentiment among respondents. Findings also showed that 
the high-skilled are less opposed to immigration than the low-skilled, the effect 
being greater in richer countries than in poorer countries. Several studies (e.g., 
Brenner and Fertig 2006; Daniels and von der Ruhr 2005; Dustmann and Preston 
2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Mayda 2006; Rustenbach 2010) that examined 
predictors  of  anti-immigrant  attitudes  in  Europe  and  United  States  in  the  past 
decade consistently found support for the human capital theory that suggests that 
anti-immigrant attitudes significantly decrease with education and one’s level of 
skills. The present analysis will also examine the economic self-interest and human 
capital theoretical perspectives using as predictors of attitudes toward immigration 
issues the respondent’s perceived economic hardship and the educational level of 
the respondent and respondent’s parents.  
Contact theory is the third major theoretical explanation used by scholars 
to explain variations in public attitudes toward immigrants (see Fetzer 2000, 4). 
Although there are several variants of the contact theory, Gordon Allport’s (1954) 
thesis remains in the literature an important departure point. Allport contended 
that positive effects of intergroup contact occur if four key conditions are satisfied: 
equal group status within the situation; common goals; intergroup cooperation; 
and the support of authorities, law, or custom (Pettygrew 1998, 66). In addition to 
these four conditions, Petttygrew (1998) noted that for optimal group interaction 
the contact situation must have ‘friendship potential’. While according to Allport’s 
contact theory, increased contact with immigrants would decrease anti-immigrant 
sentiments, other authors (see Girard, Charbit, and Lamy 1974) contended that 
personal contact with immigrants actually causes xenophobia.  In order to explain 
the strong public support for the anti-immigrant Front National party in areas of 
France  with  large  foreign-born  populations,  Perrineau  (1985)  concluded  that 
‘casual’ and not ‘personal’ (i.e., intimate relationships, friendships) contacts with  
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foreigners might generate  hostile feelings toward immigrants (Fetzer 2000). A  less 
optimistic alternative contact theory was also formulated by Forbes (1997). The author 
stated  that  even  if  immigrant-native  interaction  might  partially  contribute  to  a 
reduction  in  cultural  differences,  it  could  also  generate  ethnocentric  attitudes  and 
increased efforts to preserve intergroup differences, which in the end might favor anti-
immigrant attitudes (DiGiusto and Jolly 2008, 1-3). Acknowledging that both individual 
differences and societal norms shape intergroup contact effects, Pettygrew (1998, 80) 
noted that “the deeply prejudiced both avoid intergroup contact and resist positive 
effects from it.”  
According to Quillian (1995), the economic situation is a mediator between 
intergroup contact and the potential for conflict. The author observed that foreigners 
might be perceived as a threat if the number of immigrants would increase because 
natives  might  believe  they  have  to  compete  for  cultural  hegemony  and  scarce 
resources. Therefore, anti-immigrant sentiments are more likely to become stronger in 
periods of economic hardship (Quillian 1995). However, a recent test of the contact 
theory that examined the effect of the immigrant population size on attitudes toward 
foreigners in Europe did not find support for the thesis that anticipated a positive 
relationship between the number of immigrants at national and regional levels and 
anti-immigration  attitudes  (Rustenbach  2010).  And  a  recent  analysis  of  attitudes 
toward immigrants in France found a significant negative relationship between the 
share of foreign population in a large geographic area (department) and anti-immigrant 
sentiments. Based on these research findings it appears that an increase in immigrant 
population was more likely to decrease xenophobia and racial antipathies, suggesting, 
as the study authors concluded, that “it might be some room for optimism in the 
intergroup dynamic literature (DiGiusto and Jolly 2008, 16).” 
Despite the fact that after 2004, migrants from Central and Eastern Europe 
moved more widely across the country, most of the United Kingdom’s recent history 
migrants have been concentrated in urban areas (see Chapell, Latore, Rutter, and Shah 
2009, 4). In 2009, for instance, over a third of all foreign-born migrants (2.6 million 
people)  were  living  in  London  where  they  represent  34%  of  the  total  population 
(Rienzo 2011). Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that residents of larger cities 
have been more frequently in contact (at least casual) with immigrants than persons 
living in smaller towns or  rural areas in UK. Urban residency is considered in this 
analysis a proxy indicator for contact with immigrants and it will be used to test the 
contact theory.                        
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In  addition  to  tests  meant  to  explore  the  validity  and  the  explanatory 
power of cultural, economic, contact, and human capital theories, researchers also 
examined  the  effect  on  attitudes  toward  immigrants  of  societal  attachment, 
political behavior, and religiosity. In general, findings suggest that persons who 
have a higher level of interpersonal trust are more likely to have positive opinions 
about immigrants, while individuals who sympathize with right-wing politics are 
more  likely  to  support  anti-immigration  policies  (see  DiGiusto  and  Jolly  2008; 
Rustenbach  2010).  Recent  studies  that  investigated  the  impact  of  religious 
affiliation  on  immigration-policy  preferences  in  United  States,  found  that  more 
religious  respondents  exhibited  more  positive  attitudes  towards  immigrants, 
regardless of the religious denomination they belonged to (Daniels and Von der 
Ruhr  2005;  Smith 2006). The  present  analysis will also explore  the  relationship 
between  social  attachment  (interpersonal  and  institutional  trust)  and  attitudes 
toward  immigrants  and  immigration  policies.  One’s  political  orientation  (i.e., 
support for Conservative party vs. support for other political party) will be used to 
observe  the  effect  of  political  preferences  on  issues  regarding  immigration  in 
United Kingdom. The Conservatives’ approach
1 to immigration stresses the need to 
control immigration levels by introducing a cap on immigration and reducing the 
number  of  non-EU  immigrants  who  plan  to  work  and  live  in  United  Kingdom. 
According to the Conservatives’ manifesto, by 2015 net migration will be reduced 
from the current level of 242,000 to “tens of thousands” immigrants per year. The 
Conservative Party, the largest political party in UK, is a centre-right political party 
that adheres to the philosophies of conservatism and British unionism. Currently, 
the  Conservative  Party  governs  in  the  first  post-war  coalition  with  the  Liberal 
Democrats.  David  Cameron  is  the  Conservative  Party  leader  and  the  country’s 
Prime Minister. In 2008, when the survey data used in this analysis were collected, 
the  Labour  Party  was  the  governing  body  and  the  Conservatives  were  the 
opposition party.  
Additionally,  the  analysis  will  examine  the  relationships  religiosity  – 
attitudes  toward  immigrants  and  will  use  gender  and  age  as  control  variables. 
Regarding  gender  variations  in  attitudes,  research  found  women  to  be  more 
opposed to immigration than do men. Although not all studies found a consistent 
inter-country  effect  of  age  on  people’s  reaction  toward  immigrants  and 
                                                           
1The immigration policies supported by the Conservative Party can be found at: 
http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Where_we_stand/Immigration.aspx  
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immigration policies (see Brenner and Fertig 2006), in general, age tends to be 
negatively  associated  with  support  for  immigration (see  Berzosa  and  Valentova 
2010; Citrin,  Green, Muste, and Wong. 1997; DiGiusto and Jolly 2008; Dustmann 
and Preston 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). Recent survey data also showed 
that young people in UK are more hopeful about the future and more open to living 
in an ethnically diverse society (Lowles and Painter 2011).  
 
Data, Methods, and Hypotheses 
 
The present analysis uses the European Social Survey data collected in 2008 
on a probability sample (N= 2352) representative for the population age fifteen and 
older  in  United  Kingdom (ESS  Round  4  2008, 2011).  The  main  objective  of  the 
analysis  is  to  identify  a  set of  personal-level  indicators most  likely  to  influence 
variations in attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies. 
  Data have been analyzed using ordinary least square regression. 
Attitudes toward immigrants/immigration policies have been measured using two 
separate composite indicators that serve as dependent variables in the estimated 
statistical models. The first dependent variable measures the respondent’s support 
for restrictive immigration policies and has been computed through factor analysis 
conducted on three variables. Respondents have been asked to indicate how many 
foreign  individuals  of  the  same  ethnic  group  as  the  majority  (1),  of  different 
ethnicity as the majority (2), and how many people from poorer countries outside 
Europe  (3)  should  be  allowed  to  immigrate  to  United  Kingdom.  Individual 
responses varied from 1 (many immigrants should be allowed) to 4 (no immigrants 
should be allowed). The standardized reliability coefficient Cronbach’s Alpha for 
this index is .892. When factor analysis (PCA) was conducted, only one factor was 
extracted (Eigenvalue = 2.472; variance explained = 82.41%). Factor loadings varied 
from .895 to .933. The continuous composite index has a normal distribution (e.g., 
Skewness = .147; Kurtosis = -.363). The second dependent variable measures the 
perceived role of immigrants in society. Respondents have been asked to assess on 
a  scale  that  takes values from  zero  to  ten the  immigrants’  contribution  to the 
country’s  economy  (1),  to  the  country’s  cultural  life  (2),  and  to  the  country’s 
general well-being (3). Higher scores indicate positive perceptions of immigrants’ 
role. When reliability analysis for the three indicators was conducted a Cronbach’s 
Alpha equal to .892 was obtained. Only one factor with Eigenvalues higher than                       
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one  was  obtained  when  the  index  was  computed  through  factor  analysis 
(Eigenvalue = 2.470; variance explained = 82.34). This dependent variable has a 
normal distribution as well (e.g., Skewness = -.029; Kurtosis = -.529).  
Following are briefly presented the selected individual-level predictors of 
variation in attitudes toward immigrants. Interpersonal trust is a composite variable 
based on three indicators that measure the respondent’s opinion about people’s 
levels  of  trustworthiness  (1),  fairness  (2),  and  helpfulness  (3).  The  reliability 
coefficient Alpha for this measure is .755. One component was extracted when 
factor analysis was used as a data reduction method (Eigenvalue = 2.017; variance 
explained = 67.23%). Higher values of the factor scores indicate a higher level of 
interpersonal  trust.  Institutional  trust  is  a  composite  measure  as  well,  formed 
based  on  three  indicators  that  measure  the  respondent’s  level  of  trust  in  the 
country’s parliament (1), the country’s legal system (2), and the national police (3). 
The  reliability  coefficient  Alpha  for  the  index  is  .747.  The  index  has  been 
constructed through factor analysis and one component was extracted (Eigenvalue 
=1.996; variance explained = 66.53%). Higher values for factor scores indicate a 
higher  level  of  institutional  trust.  Economic  hardship  –  the  question  used  to 
measure economic hardship asked respondents to indicate the likelihood of not 
having  “enough  money  for  household  necessities  in  the  next  12  months.”  This 
ordinal  level  indicator  takes  values  from  1  (not  at  all  likely)  to  4  (very  likely). 
Religiosity – one’s self-assessed degree of religiosity takes values from zero (not at 
all religious) to 10 (very religious). Political orientation (Conservative) – this dummy 
variable  was  coded  1  for  respondents  who  acknowledged  closeness  to  the 
Conservative Party and zero otherwise. Ethnic minority – a dummy variable coded 1 
for  respondents  who  belong  to  an  ethnic  minority  group  and  zero  otherwise. 
Gender  –  a  dummy  variable  coded  1  for  males  and  zero  for  females.  Age  –  a 
continuous variable  that  takes  values  from  15  to  96.  Education  –  respondent’s 
highest level of education takes values from zero (no qualifications) to 5 (advanced 
graduate degree). Parents’ education – is an additive measure that combined the 
parents’ highest level of education; it takes values from zero (both parents have no 
qualifications) to 10 (both parents have advanced graduate degrees). Residency – 
this dummy variable is coded 1 for residents of large urban areas and outskirts of 
large cities and zero otherwise. Place of birth – this variable is coded zero if neither 
the respondent or his/her parents were born in UK, 1 if the respondent was born in 
UK but has foreign-born parents, 2 if the respondent and one of his/her parents  
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were born in UK, and 3 if the respondent and his/her parents were all born in United 
Kingdom. A set of three dummy variables were created based on this classification, 
natives being the reference group (i.e., UK-born respondent and both parents).  
It is hypothesized that education, religiosity, interpersonal and institutional trust, 
ethnic minority status, and residency in larger urban areas will be associated with positive 
perceptions of immigrants and a diminished support for anti-immigration policies. It is 
expected  that  support  for  anti-immigration  policies  and  negative  perceptions  of 
immigrants’ role in society will increase with age and perceived economic hardship. It is 
anticipated  that  native  Britons  will  acknowledge  a  higher  support  for  restrictive 
immigration policies and will be less appreciative of the immigrants’ contribution to the 
well-being of the society and to the economic and cultural life in UK when compared to 
persons from immigrant families. 
 
Results 
 
Table 1 presents the distribution of responses for the indicators included in the 
composite index that measured attitudes toward immigration policies and the mean 
values for responses at questions included in the index that measured recognition of the 
value  of  immigrants  to  the  economy,  culture,  and  quality  of  life  in  UK.  Results  are 
presented  separately  for  four  groups  that  differ  in  terms  of  family  immigration 
background. Preliminary analyses (see Table 1) show that the family background and 
immigration history influence at some degree the public perception of the immigrants’ 
contribution to the British society and also have an impact on one’s opinions about 
immigration policies.  
For  instance,  it  can  be  noticed  that  the  largest  proportion  of  people  who 
consider that no immigrants should be allowed to enter the country are found within the 
group of UK-born respondents whose parents are natives as well. If 5% of those born 
abroad think that no immigrants of the same ethnicity/race as the majority should be 
allowed in the country, about 10% of the natives share this opinion. In addition, about 
16% of the natives think that no foreigners belonging to minority ethnic groups should be 
accepted as immigrants in UK and almost one in five natives (19.2%) considered that no 
immigrants  from  poorer  countries  should  be  allowed  to  permanently  settle  in  UK. 
Overall, the majority of native respondents want fewer immigrants, while the majority of 
respondents from immigrant families are more likely to favor an ‘open-door’ policy, 
arguing that ‘some’ or ‘many’ immigrants should be allowed into United Kingdom.                       
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Table 1: Frequency distributions, means, and standard deviations for attitudes 
toward immigrants and immigration policies (N = 2352) 
  How many immigrants of the same  
race/ethnic group as the majority should be 
allowed? 
Is immigration bad (0) 
or good (10) for the 
economy? 
  Many  Some  A few  None  Mean  SD 
1. Foreign-born 
respondent & parents    
19.4%  48.9%  26.7%  5.0%  6.10  2.42 
2. UK-born respondent 
& foreign-born parents 
15.1%  56.2%  26.0%  2.7%  5.35  2.47 
3. UK-born respondent 
& one parent 
19.8%  42.0%  29.0%  9.3%  5.08  2.58 
4. UK-born respondent 
& both parents 
7.9%  52.5%  29.8%  9.8%  4.36  2.36 
  How many immigrants of different 
race/ethnic group as the majority should be 
allowed? 
Is the country’s 
cultural life 
undermined (0) or 
enriched (10) by 
immigrants? 
  Many  Some  A few  None  Mean  SD 
1. Foreign-born 
respondent & parents    
16.5%  44.5%  33.0%  6.0%  6.44  2.37 
2. UK-born respondent 
& foreign-born parents 
12.3%  54.8%  30.1%  2.7%  6.04  2.38 
3. UK-born respondent 
& one parent 
14.2%  43.8%  30.2%  11.7%  5.43  2.69 
4. UK-born respondent 
& both parents 
5.9%  43.2%  35.0%  16.0%  4.58  2.58 
  How many immigrants from poorer countries 
outside Europe should be allowed? 
Immigrants make 
country a worse (0) or 
a better place (10) to 
live? 
  Many  Some  A few  None  Mean  SD 
1. Foreign-born 
respondent & parents    
16.8%  47.3%  25.0%  10.9%  6.48  2.40 
2. UK-born respondent 
& foreign-born parents 
9.6%  56.2%  27.4%  6.8%  5.24  2.31 
3. UK-born respondent 
& one parent 
12.3%  46.9%  25.9%  14.8%  4.85  2.47 
4. UK-born respondent 
& both parents 
6.0%  37.6%  37.2%  19.2%  4.24  2.41 
 
It can also be observed that, on average, the positive perception of the 
immigrants’ role in the society gradually and constantly decreases with an increase 
in the number of UK-born family members (i.e., respondent and parents). When 
only the respondent’s and his/her parents’ place of birth are considered, data show  
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that on a scale from zero (negative perception) to ten (positive perception), ratings 
of the immigrants role in society vary from 4.36 to 6.10 (perception of immigrants’ 
contribution  to  the  country’s  economy),  from  4.58  to  6.44  (perception  of 
immigrants’ contribution to the cultural life), and from 4.24 to 6.48 (perception of 
immigrants’ contribution to the society’s well-being). Lowest ratings are expressed 
by  natives  and  highest  ratings  are  given  by  foreign-born  residents.  UK-born 
respondents with one foreign-born parent and one UK-born parent had the second 
lowest ratings and UK-born respondents with both parents born abroad had the 
second highest ratings. 
 
Table 2: Frequencies and descriptive statistics for study variables 
 
 
Total sample 
(N = 2352) 
Natives 
(N = 1921) 
Non-Natives 
(N = 431) 
Mean or % 
 
SD  Mean or 
% 
 
SD  Mean or 
% 
 
SD 
Support for anti-immigration 
policies 
.000  1.00  .067  .98  -.310  1.02 
Positive views of immigrants’ 
role in society 
.000  1.00  -.107  .97  .483  .99 
Interpersonal trust  .000  1.00  .019  .98  -.087  1.08 
Institutional trust  .000  1.00  -.043  .97  .196  1.09 
Economic hardship  2.13  .94  2.12  .94  2.16  .96 
Religiosity  4.05  3.01  3.84  2.93  4.95  3.16 
Political orientation 
  (Conservative Party)  
17.09%    18.53%    10.67%   
Respondent’s education  2.08  1.63  2.05  1.61  2.25  1.71 
Parents’ education  4.18  2.79  4.09  2.72  4.59  3.05 
Ethnic minority  6.9%    1.46%    31.09%   
Residency (large urban area)  31.34%    29.10%    41.30%   
Gender (Male)  45.58%    45.18%    47.33%   
Age  49.14  18.53  50.29  18.48  44.00  17.92 
Place of birth             
Respondent & parents  
  born outside UK 
8.16%           
Respondent born UK,  
  foreign-born parents  
3.18%           
Respondent & only one  
  parent born in UK  
6.98%           
Respondent & both parents  
born in UK                                           
81.68%           
 
Due to relatively small sample sizes for subsamples that represent families 
with  at  least  one  foreign-born  person,  in  multivariate  analyses  the  effect  of                       
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individual-level indicators on attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies 
were examined separately only for two subgroups. One subsample includes natives 
(N = 1921) and the second subsample (N = 431) of first-generation immigrants, 
includes  persons  who  are  immigrants  or  are  UK-born  but  have  at  least  one 
immigrant parent. Table 2 shows the frequency distribution or descriptive statistics 
for the variables used in multivariate statistical analyses. 
Based  on  the  results
2  presented  in  table  3  it  can  be  observed  that 
respondent’s education has the largest contribution (Beta = -.194; p < .001) to the 
explanatory power (R square = .184) of the model that analyzes data for the entire 
sample. With an increase in one’s level of education there is a significant decrease 
in support for anti-immigration policies. Restrictive immigration policies are also 
less likely to be supported by persons who have higher levels of interpersonal trust 
(Beta = -.168; p < .001) and institutional trust (Beta = -.128; p < .001), by persons 
who are more religious (Beta = -.068; p < .01), by individuals whose parents are 
better educated (Beta = -.060; p < .01), and by people who live in larger cities and 
suburban areas surrounding them (Beta = -.048; p < .05). Men appeared to be 
significantly less supportive of restrictive immigration policies (Beta = -.053; p < .01) 
than women, when controlling for the other variables in the model. Compared to 
natives, foreign-born residents (Beta = -.061; p < .01) were also significantly less 
likely to support anti-immigration policies. Individuals born in UK from foreign-born 
parents  do  not  appear  to  have  significantly  different  attitudes  regarding 
immigration policies when compared to native Britons.  
While in the overall sample financial distress does not appear to impact 
significantly opinions about future immigration levels, a person’s age and  one’s 
political  orientation  are  important  predictors  of  negative  attitudes  toward 
immigrants. With an increase in one’s age there is a significant support for anti-
immigration policies (Beta = .129; p < .001). Persons who express closeness to the 
Conservative Party are more likely to support restrictive immigration policies (Beta 
= .066; p < .01) than those who have a different political orientation. 
 
 
                                                           
2 In order to avoid multicollinearity, the variable ‘ethnic minority’ has not been used in 
analyses for the overall sample. This variable is highly correlated (r = .49, p < .001) with the 
dummy variable that compares the attitudes of first generation immigrants to the attitudes 
expressed by the reference group. 
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Table 3: OLS Estimates for Support for Anti-Immigration Policies  
 
 
Total sample 
(N = 2352) 
Natives 
(N = 1921) 
Non-Natives 
(N = 431) 
B 
(Std. 
Error) 
Beta  B 
(Std. 
Error) 
Beta  B 
(Std. 
Error) 
Beta 
Interpersonal trust  -.174*** 
(.025) 
-.168  -.181*** 
(.028) 
-.173  -.175** 
(.056) 
-.181 
Institutional trust  -.129*** 
(.024) 
-.128  -.124*** 
(.027) 
-.121  -.135** 
(.052) 
-.144 
Economic hardship  .044 
(.025) 
.040  .071** 
(028) 
.065  -.087 
(.062) 
-.077 
Religiosity  -.023** 
(.008) 
-.068  -.025** 
(.009) 
-.073  -.006 
(.018) 
-.020 
Political orientation 
  (Conservative Party)  
.175** 
(.058) 
.066  .179** 
(.061) 
.071  .298 
(.189) 
.083 
Respondent’s education  -.118*** 
(.015) 
-.194  -.121*** 
(.016) 
-.200  -.102** 
(.035) 
-.165 
Parents’ education  -.022** 
(.009) 
-.060  -.016 
(010) 
-.045  -.048* 
(.020) 
-.140 
Ethnic minority      -.028 
(.214) 
-.003  -.083 
(.123) 
-.037 
Residency  
  (large urban area) 
-.105* 
(.047) 
-.048  -.076 
(.052) 
-.035  -.202 
(.111) 
-.095 
Gender (Male)  -.106** 
(.044) 
-.053  -.116* 
(.048) 
-.058  -.042 
(.108) 
-.020 
Age  .007*** 
(.001) 
.129  .007*** 
(.002) 
.134  .009** 
(.003) 
.148 
Respondent & parents  
  born outside UK 
-.225** 
(.083) 
-.061         
Respondent born UK,  
  foreign-born parents  
-.225 
(.124) 
-.039         
Respondent & one  
  parent born in UK 
-.165* 
(.080) 
-.041         
Constant  .082 
(.121) 
  .005 
(.136) 
  .100 
(.258) 
 
Adjusted R Square  .184  .171  .159 
***p < .001; **p < .01: *p < .05. 
 
Two additional models explored attitudes toward immigration policies 
for  two  separate  subsamples;  one  subsample  (N  =  1921)  includes  only 
respondents born in UK whose parents were also born in UK and the other 
subsample  (N  =431)  includes  respondents  who  were  themselves  and  their 
parents  born  abroad  or  were  UK-born  but  had  at  least  one  parent  born 
abroad.  Although  inter-group  differences  in  means  for  attitudes  toward 
immigration policies do exist (see Table 2), in both subsamples, similar effects 
are  recorded  for  several  variables  included  in  the  estimated  models.  For                       
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instance,  in  both  subsamples  respondent’s  education,  one’s  level  of 
interpersonal trust, and one’s level of institutional trust are negatively related 
to  support  for  anti-immigration  policies,  while  age  is  positively  and 
significantly related to support for restrictive immigration policies not only for 
the majoritarian  group (Beta =  .134;  p <  .001), but  for  non-natives as well 
(Beta = .148; p < .01). 
While native Britons who acknowledge a higher degree of religiosity 
tend to oppose restrictive immigration policies (Beta = -.073; p < .01), UK-born 
persons who anticipate economic hardship are more likely to support anti-
immigration  policies (Beta  =  .065; p <  .01). Similar  attitudes  are  shared by 
natives (Beta = .071; p < .01) who feel closer to the Conservative Party.  
Although the direction of the effect is the same in both subsamples, 
gender has a significant effect on attitudes regarding immigration levels only 
in  the  majoritarian  sample.  Native  males  are  more  opposed  to  restrictive 
immigration  polices  than  native  women  (Beta  =  -.058;  p  <  .05).  Parents’ 
education  appears  to  significantly  influence  attitudes  toward  immigration 
policies only  in the subsample that  includes  non-natives  (Beta =  -.140;  p  < 
.05).  
Even if in both subsamples respondents belonging to ethnic minority 
groups  and  persons  who  live  in  large  cities  tend  to  oppose  restrictive 
immigration policies, when controlling for the other variables in the model, 
these effects are not large enough to be significant. The selected variables 
included in the presented statistical models explain about the same amount of 
variance (i.e., approximately 17% for the majoritarian subsample and 16% for 
the  subsample  with  at  least  one  foreign-born  person  in  the  respondent’s 
family) in attitudes regarding restrictive immigration policies.    
Further analyses tried to identify the variables more likely to predict 
citizens’  positive  perceptions  of  the immigrants’ role  in the  British  society. 
Approximately  31%  of  the  variation  in  public  opinion  is  explained  by  the 
model for the total sample presented in table 4. Similar to previous findings, 
respondents who expressed higher levels of interpersonal (Beta = .216; p < 
.001) and institutional trust (Beta = .228; p < .001) were more appreciative of 
the immigrants’ contribution to the economy, culture, and general well-being 
of the society.  
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Table 4: OLS Estimates for Positive Views of Immigrants’ Role in Society 
 
 
Total sample 
(N = 2352) 
Natives 
(N = 1921) 
Non-Natives 
(N = 431) 
B 
(Std. Error) 
Beta  B 
(Std. Error) 
Beta  B 
(Std. Error) 
Beta 
Interpersonal trust  .223*** 
(.023) 
.216  .231*** 
(.026) 
.224  .229*** 
(.052) 
.243 
Institutional trust  .229*** 
(.022) 
.228  .244*** 
(.025) 
.243  .191*** 
(.049) 
.209 
Economic hardship  -.055* 
(.023) 
-.050  -.078** 
(025) 
-.065  .005 
(.058) 
.004 
Religiosity  .018** 
(.007) 
.054  .015* 
(.008) 
.047  .021 
(.017) 
.065 
Conservative Party 
supporter 
-.211*** 
(.054) 
-.079  -.222*** 
(.056) 
-.089  -.159 
(.177) 
-.045 
Respondent’s education  .115*** 
(.014) 
.189  .121*** 
(.015) 
.203  .083* 
(.033) 
.138 
Parents’ education  .029*** 
(.008) 
.082  .034*** 
(009) 
.096  .016* 
(.019) 
.048 
Ethnic minority      -.005 
(.195) 
-.001  .425*** 
(.115) 
.196 
Residency  
  (large urban area) 
.156*** 
(.043) 
.072  .126** 
(.047) 
.059  .235* 
(.104) 
.114 
Gender (Male)  .145*** 
(.040) 
.072  .138** 
(.044) 
.071  .128 
(.101) 
.063 
Age  -.003* 
(.001) 
-.052  -.003* 
(.001) 
-.061  .000 
(.003) 
.007 
Respondent & parents  
  born outside UK 
.622*** 
(.076) 
.171         
Respondent born UK,  
  foreign-born parents  
.386*** 
(.113) 
.068         
Respondent & one  
  parent born in UK 
.166* 
(.079) 
.042         
Constant  -.316** 
(.111) 
  -.256* 
(.124) 
  -.167 
(.243) 
 
Adjusted R Square  .308  .290  .212 
***p < .001; **p < .01: *p < .05. 
 
The  respondent’s  education  and  the  respondent’s  parents’  educational 
level are both significantly and positively related to the dependent variable. Men, 
persons who are more religious, and residents of larger urban areas have more 
positive  views  of  immigrants’  role  in  society  than,  respectively,  women,  less 
religious individuals, and people who live in rural or smaller urban areas. Foreign-
born individuals and native persons with one or both parents born abroad have a                       
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significantly more positive perception of immigrants and their role in society than 
native Britons. However, individuals who experience financial difficulties, persons 
who sympathize with the Conservative Party and older respondents tend to share a 
less positive view of the immigrants’ contribution to the British society. 
For natives and non-natives as well, interpersonal trust, institutional trust, 
and  residency  in  large  cities  are  significantly  and  positively  related  to  positive 
perceptions  of  immigration.  While  UK-born  ethnic  minorities  do  not  differ 
significantly in their opinions about immigrants’ role in society when compared to 
non-minority natives, persons belonging to ethnic minority groups in the foreign-
born subsample tend to have a much more positive opinion of the immigrants’ 
contribution to the British society than non-minority respondents from immigrant 
families. However, it should be noted that the relatively small representation of 
UK-born ethnic minorities could have impacted the results pertaining to natives’ 
opinions.  If  in  the  majoritarian  subsample  respondents  belonging  to  an  ethnic 
minority  group  represent  only  1.5%,  in  the  foreign-born  subsample  ethnic 
minorities represent 31% of subsample size.  
Political orientation, gender, and age influence significantly the opinions 
expressed  by  native  respondents  only.  While  native  men  tend  to  perceive 
immigrants  in  more  positive  terms  than  native  women  do,  older  UK-born 
individuals,  those  who  anticipate  economic  hardship  and  sympathizers  of  the 
Conservative  Party  are  less  likely  to  acknowledge  the  immigrants’  positive 
contribution to the economic and cultural life of the British society than people 
who  are  younger,  better-off  economically,  and  those  who  feel  closer  to  other 
political parties, respectively. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
  
By simultaneously testing alternative theoretical explanations, this paper 
examined several individual-level factors most likely to influence attitudes toward 
immigration policies and immigrants in general, expressed by native Britons and 
also  by  persons  who  are  first  and  second  generation  immigrants  in  United 
Kingdom. Results show that anti-immigrant attitudes and support for restrictive 
immigration policies are highly correlated in UK. Persons who indirectly express 
reservations toward multiculturalism (i.e., have a negative view of the immigrants’ 
contribution to the economy, culture, and well-being of the British society) are  
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more likely to favor anti-immigration policies (e.g., for natives: r = .64, p < .001; for 
non-natives: r = .55, p < .001). Similar to findings from prior studies (see Dustmann 
and  Preston  2007),  a  large  segment  of  the  UK  population  favors  restrictive 
immigration  policies,  especially  when  potential  immigrants  are  ethnic/racial 
minorities and the sending country is a poor non-European state. Approximately 
51% of native Britons believe that no immigrants or only a few immigrants who 
belong to ethnic/racial minority groups from poor countries should be allowed in 
UK. Similar attitudes are expressed by the majority of natives (56.4%) regarding 
potential  immigration  from  poor  countries  outside  Europe.  Support  for  anti-
immigration policies is also expressed by more than one third of those who are first 
and  second  generation  immigrants.    While  only  noneconomic  characteristics 
appear to significantly influence immigration-related attitudes expressed by non-
natives, the natives’ perception of immigrants and their reaction to immigration 
policies  is  shaped  by  personal  economic  circumstances,  in  addition  to  socio-
demographic and cultural factors. 
As anticipated, and in support of the cultural marginality thesis (see Fetzer 
2000), when compared to natives, persons from immigrant families are significantly 
less likely to favor anti-immigration policies and are significantly more likely to 
perceive in positive terms the immigrants’ contribution to society. It appears that 
being  foreign-born  and/or  having  foreign-born  parents  were  the  defining 
characteristics  of  a  group,  whose  identity,  despite  individual  differences  in 
socioeconomic, cultural, and ethnic background, might be a result of shared similar 
life experiences in the new adoptive country. Results are similar to findings by 
Espenshade and Calhoun (1993), who determined that ‘cultural affinity’ (i.e., being 
a  racial/ethnic  minority  and  foreign-born)  influenced  attitudes  toward  illegal 
immigrants in US.  However, it should be noted that in United Kingdom the impact 
of  immigrant  family  status  on  attitudinal  change  is  less  important  than  one’s 
societal attachment and education. Consistent with previous research (Rustenbach 
2010), persons who display a high level of interpersonal trust are more likely to 
oppose  restrictive  immigration  policies  and  tend  to  believe  that  immigration 
enriched the country’s culture and strengthened the economy. Similar attitudes are 
expressed by persons who have high levels of confidence in the country’s legal 
system, parliament, and national police. In the overall sample, when controlling for 
immigration status, respondent’s education and institutional trust are the strongest 
predictors of variations in immigration-related attitudes.                         
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Although  this  study  finds  partial  support  for  the  economic  self-interest 
perspective, results suggest that non-economic factors have a stronger impact on 
attitudes toward immigration expressed by natives and persons from immigrant 
families  as  well.  While  economically  vulnerable  native  citizens  are  significantly 
more likely to support anti-immigration policies and tend to have a negative view 
of  immigrants,  economic  factors  do  not  appear  to  significantly  impact  the 
immigration-related  attitudes  expressed  by  non-native  persons.  Consistent  with 
prior research (Brenner and Fertig 2006; Daniels and von der Ruhr 2005; Dustmann 
and  Preston  2007;  Fetzer  2000;  Hainmueller  and  Hiscox  2007;  Mayda  2006; 
Rustenbach 2010), it appears that the human capital theoretical perspective offers 
a  better  explanation  of  attitudinal  change  regarding  immigration  issues.  As 
hypothesized, with an increase in one’s level of education and in the educational 
level of  the  respondent’s  parents  there  is  a  significant  decrease  in  support for 
restrictive  immigration  policies  and  an  increase  in  positive  perceptions  of 
immigrants. Educational level is one of the strongest predictors of attitudes toward 
immigration for both subsamples (natives and non-natives). Even if the parents’ 
education has a weaker effect on attitudes than respondent’s education does, the 
variable significantly predicts positive perceptions of immigrants’ contribution to 
the British society for both subsamples. As   Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007, 437) 
observed, the effect of education/skills on immigration attitudes differs from the 
conventional  arguments  about  labor-market  competition.  Education  actually 
transforms the values held by individuals, encouraging them to have more tolerant 
and cosmopolitan views of the world and be more open to multiculturalism. 
Although only a proxy measure was used to test the competing contact 
hypotheses, results appear to validate Allport’s (1954) thesis, according to which 
increased  contact  with  immigrants  would  decrease  one’s  xenophobic  and 
ethnocentric attitudes. Results are consistent with findings obtained by DiGiusto 
and  Jolly  (2008),  who  identified  in  France  a  significant  negative  relationship 
between  the  share  of  foreign  population  in  a  large  geographic  area  and  anti-
immigrant sentiments. In particular, results suggest that native Britons living in 
large  urban  areas, where  most  immigrants  reside  in  UK,  are  less  supportive  of 
restrictive immigration policies and are significantly more likely to acknowledge the 
immigrants’ positive contribution to the economic and cultural life of the British 
society than natives who live in rural areas or smaller cities. Recent research (see 
Blinder  2011)  based  on  Citizenship  Survey  2008-2009  also  found  that  when  
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compared  to  residents  of  other  regions,  white  UK-born  Londoners  and  other 
residents of London, where migrants are most heavily concentrated, are less likely 
to favor sharp reductions in migration to the UK.  
As hypothesized and similar to results presented in prior research studies 
(DiGiusto and Jolly 2008; Rustenbach 2010) that examined the effect of political 
preferences (i.e., left-versus-right political inclination) on attitude formation, native 
Britons  who  are  Conservative  Party  supporters  are  more  likely  to  favor  anti-
immigration policies and are more likely to consider that immigrants had a negative 
impact on the country’s culture, economy, and general well-being. Consistent with 
research conducted in United States (see Daniels and Von der Ruhr 2005; Smith 
2006)  and  as  hypothesized,  the  self-assessed  level  of  religiosity  appears  to 
influence  attitudes  toward  immigrants,  independent  of  one’s  religious 
denomination.  More  religious  natives  are  less  likely  to  support  restrictive 
immigration policies and tend to think that the immigrants’ contribution to society 
is  beneficial.  Similar  to  studies  conducted  in  other  countries  (Berzosa  and 
Valentova 2010; Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong, 1997; DiGiusto and Jolly 2008; 
Dustmann and Preston 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007), gender and age impact 
immigration-related public attitudes in United Kingdom as well. With an increase in 
one’s age there is an increase in support for anti-immigration policies. Interestingly, 
older persons in both subsamples (natives and non-natives) share similar views 
regarding immigration policies and immigrants in general. Gender differences in 
attitudes are observed only for native Britons. When compared to women, men are 
significantly more likely to support ‘open-door’ immigration policies and appear to 
be more appreciative of multiculturalism. 
To summarize, this analysis found support for all the main theories that 
explain  attitudinal  variation  in  the  public’s  opinion  about  immigration-related 
issues in United Kingdom. It should be noted, however, that this is a secondary 
analysis limited by the existent data, which did not include potentially important 
indicators.  For  instance,  respondents were  not  asked  to  justify  or explain  their 
opinions regarding immigration-related issues and there is no way of knowing the 
rationale  behind  their  attitudes  toward  immigrants  or  immigration  policies. 
Although the 2008 European Social Survey does not include questions regarding 
one’s direct experience/contact with immigrants, other recent surveys conducted 
in United Kingdom (see Blinder 2011) found that only a small number of British 
citizens  claimed  that  their  own  neighborhood  is  having  problems  due  to                       
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immigrants. And approximately 85% of the respondents participating in the 2008-
2009 Citizen Survey declared that people of diverse backgrounds get along well in 
their particular local area. Blinder (2011, 8) contended that the Britons’ relatively 
strong  support  for  restrictive  immigration  policies  is  in  fact  an  expression  of  a 
general  concern  regarding  United  Kingdom  as  a  whole,  rather  than  a  logic 
consequence of a direct negative personal experience with foreign-born individuals 
in one’s own community.  
This  study  showed  that  two  subjective  and  highly  correlated  factors, 
interpersonal  trust  and  confidence  in  important  institutions  (e.g.,  the  country’s 
Parliament, the legal system, and the police), are among the strongest predictors of 
variations in attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies. Consequently, 
it could be assumed that the natives’ diminished support for multiculturalism in UK 
is partially a reflection of a low level of institutional trust.  Although public beliefs 
regarding important institutions are shaped by the media, political elites, and one’s 
direct experiences with the police or the legal system, for instance, as Rothstein 
(2005) contended, the government’s ability to be fair and impartial is a major trust-
creating factor at both interpersonal and institutional level. Even if the present 
analysis  could  not  establish  causal  relationships,  results  appear  to  support  the 
contention (see Rothstein and Stolle’s 2003) that one’s level of interpersonal trust 
is significantly influenced by the individual’s trust in policy-implementing societal 
institutions. In the overall sample there is a significant positive relationship (r = 
.387; p < .001) between interpersonal trust and institutional trust. The relationship 
is stronger for the subsample of native Britons (r = .414; p < .001) than it is for the 
subsample of persons who are first or second generation immigrants (r = .312; p < 
.001), suggesting that trust in institutions, particularly in those that provide public 
services  (e.g.,  the  justice  system),  translates  at  the  personal  level  in  the  trust 
citizens express toward each other, influencing their perception of foreigners as 
well.  
As this research and other studies suggest (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; 
Mayda 2006) non-economic factors affect public attitudes toward immigration in 
United Kingdom more than economic variables do. Different from conventional 
arguments about labor-market competition, people with higher education levels 
are  more  likely  to  oppose  restrictive  immigration  policies  and  tend  to  favor 
multiculturalism.  Although  the  current  British  government  plans  to  implement 
restrictive  immigration  policies  in  the  near  future,  the  country  has  already  a  
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noteworthy  foreign-born  population,  whose  integration  in  society  could  be 
negatively affected if at the government level the benefits and consequences of 
multiculturalism are not properly explained to the public and beliefs that foster 
animosity toward foreigners are not discouraged. In addition, the natives’ and non-
natives’ confidence in major institutions, an important indicator of the political 
health of the society as a whole, risks to be eroded if immigration and immigrants 
will continue to be presented by government officials as problematic. The 2011 
riots in urban areas of England characterized by a higher proportion of households 
with no workers, higher levels of child poverty, higher youth unemployment rates, 
and  lower  levels  of  educational  attainment  than  the  corresponding  national 
average  figures  (see  Ben-Galim  and  Gottfried  2011)  suggest  that  government 
policies focusing on reducing economic inequality by creating viable educational 
and employment opportunities for people living in deprived communities might 
have  more  long-term  positive  effects  on  the  country’s  general  well-being,  the 
citizens’ perception of immigrants, and the public’s level of institutional trust than 
restrictive immigration policies alone could achieve. 
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